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ACCESS TO JUSTICE
JAMES D. COX*
The theme of this symposium is Access to Justice. America has long been
distinctive among developed countries in arming its Davids with procedural
tools to challenge commercial Goliaths. Our progress in providing equal justice
under the law has been nurtured through numerous procedural developments,
such as notice pleading, class actions, and the American rule of the costs of
litigation. These efforts have attracted recent efforts in other countries to
experiment with such devices. Despite these procedural icons, several legal
developments reviewed in this symposium raise the concern that there is today
a bit less, if not a good deal less, access to justice.
In Pleading as Information-Forcing, Alex Reinert observes that the
Supreme Court’s emphasis in the pleading context on “conclusory” and
“plausible” provides the key for understanding the shift Iqbal and Twombly
have introduced for pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While
each of these expressions enjoys a long history in pretrial procedures, Professor
Reinert observes that confusion abounds in Iqbal and Twombly because the
Supreme Court has interjected the expressions into the new context of pleading,
so that this necessarily accords to each term a meaning different from its
historical usage. He faults the Court for not setting forth what objective is being
sought by its new formulation. Had the Court done so, lower courts could have
hewed to that objective in the Iqbal–Twombly pleading era in a clearer and
more predictable manner. Filling the void, Professor Reinert draws upon
analogies in the areas of contract and legislative interpretation to illustrate how
the new pleading standard can best serve a role of information-forcing.
Professor Edward Harnett provides his own insights as to the meaning of
“conclusory” and “plausible” in the post-Iqbal–Twombly world. In Taming
Twombly: An Update After Matrixx, Professor Harnett offers practical insights
on how, with care and some attention to the objective of the complaint’s
allegations, the practitioner can best accommodate Iqbal and Twombly. While
1
he is critical of the Court’s treatment of the plausibility issue in Matrixx, one
wonders whether the complaint he raises is overstated. The important
contribution of Matrixx is rejecting a rigid requirement that the probability of
an uncertain event’s occurrence had to rise to the level of statistical significance
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to be material. To have acceded to this position—as counseled by the defense
and taken in the trial court—would have weakened substantially the longapplied standard of materiality of speculative events, where the materiality is
determined by the joint assessment of probability and magnitude. Thus—much
as the plaintiffs argued in Matrixx—a very low probability that the company’s
only product, Zicam, caused anosmia would nonetheless, in the eyes of the trier
of fact, be material, because if this outcome were correct, it would mean the end
of the company, since it truly had but a single product line. Plausibility must be
assessed not in terms of the probability that Zicam caused anosmia, but rather
whether the magnitude of that event would be so great that even though its
possibility is implausible it would still be material. Professor Harnett’s wise
counsel for how practitioners can best address the new environment—
particularly by identifying in the complaint the allegations that are factual and
setting forth facts and other bases that the plaintiff believes support the
inferences to be drawn from the alleged facts—are immensely useful
suggestions.
How the plaintiff’s path to the jury is obstructed, if not terminated, by
several recent legal pre-trial developments is examined by Professor Michael J.
Kaufman and John M. Wunderlich in The Judicial Access Barriers to Remedies
for Securities Fraud. Among the developments closely analyzed are the “strong
inference” pleading standard introduced in 1995 by the Private Securities
2
Litigation Reform Act, with particular attention given to the courts’ pushback
on the use of circumstantial evidence and confidential witnesses; the potential
that loss causation issues may resurface into the class action certification
decision notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Erica P. John
3
4
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.; and expert disqualification under Daubert. The
authors provide a thoughtful analysis regarding how these developments
confront the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a jury trial, making the case
that the Supreme Court and lower courts have provided incomplete analysis of
the constitutional implications of such developments that remove from the jury
such important factual inquiries. Furthermore, they review a good deal of
empirical evidence that suggests that the courts employ simplifying heuristics
that bias decisions against minorities and others as a consequence of the
increasing accretion of power in the judiciary to make such fact-based findings.
5
Professor Geoffrey Miller examines the effects of whether Tellabs’ “cogent
and compelling” language entails a unitary or bifurcated test. Whether a single
or dual standard applies, he concludes that in either case a pleading standard
that entails a goal greater than giving the defendant notice of the bases for the
plaintiff’s allegations poses a serious risk of rejecting meritorious claims
2. Pub. L. No. 104–67, § 101, 109 Stat 737, 743 (Dec. 22, 1995) amending Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 21D(b)(2), 48 Stat. 881, 889 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006)).
3. 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
4. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
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through the “strong inference” filter, particularly when this heightened pleading
6
requirement is coupled, as it is, with the PSLRA’s bar to discovery. To address
this risk, he presents in A Modest Proposal for Securities Fraud Pleading After
Tellabs a thoughtful and intriguing process by which a suit failing the
heightened pleading standard could continue, at least through discovery, so that
not only may the suit’s claimants be afforded access to justice, but such
continuance will be with conditions that insulate the defendant from bearing the
costs of the suit’s continuation should the suit not prove successful.
Increasingly, the mantra driving law reform, particularly in the area of
business organizations, is private ordering. In Arbitration of Investors’ Claims
Against Issuers: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, Professor Barbara Black
provides a balanced review of the legal hurdles to be faced by provisions in
company documents that force shareholder claims to arbitration, rather than
the judicial process, regardless of whether the claim is derivative, class, or
individual. She closely examines the challenges both under federal and state law
regarding the validity of such a bylaw or a provision in the articles of
incorporation. In the background of this discussion lurks the ultimate question
of who truly benefits from arbitration; the answer to this question is likely
suggested by the fact that it is business and managers—not consumers or
investors—who are the driving forces behind this contemporary initiative.
Arbitration continues to be the darling of business and has become
ubiquitous in an ever-increasing range of commercial transactions. Professor
Lawrence Cunningham’s Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence:
How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts is a must read for anyone
who believes the growth of arbitration is the result of mutual consent, even
among sophisticated and equal contracting parties. Professor Cunningham
insightfully disrobes the Supreme Court’s contract rhetoric to reveal how, over
the years, the Court has distorted well-established contract principles to
advance the Justices’ ideological vision of what they, or at least five of them,
believe is a better world, contract principles notwithstanding.
7
Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd. dramatically constricted the
scope of the U.S. antifraud provision by holding that Congress never intended it
to proscribe fraud in international securities transactions, except when the fraud
occurs through a U.S. securities exchange or otherwise is a transaction made
within the United States. In Remedies for Foreign Investors Under U.S. Federal
Securities Law, Professor Hannah L. Buxbaum closely reviews post-Morrison
decisions to conclude that Morrison’s approach does not complement complex
global transactions as well as the former “conducts and effects” approach,
certainly in the context of balancing the multiple interests of the litigants and
nations as historically occurred through the “conduct and effects” comity lens.
Significantly, Professor Buxbaum explores two possible approaches to
6. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21D(b)(3), 48 Stat. 881, 889 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) (2006)).
7. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
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addressing the rough patches created by Morrison: foreign investors invoking
foreign-based claims in U.S. courts and recovery by the SEC pursuant to the
FAIR fund mechanism. Her thorough consideration of each of these
approaches to the law sets the stage for ongoing developments respecting
whether foreign investors can enjoy access to justice in U.S. courts.
Thus, one leaves the symposium questioning whether we are just now
passing through a rough patch in the road toward access to justice or whether
we have departed from the route. The articles assembled in this symposium do
not answer this question, but each sheds its share of light on the problems and
provides a healthy understanding of the issues. We can ask for no better beacon
to illuminate the path toward justice.

